We provide existence results in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. We show that there always exists a stable pairwise network in this game, and provide a condition which ensures the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Moreover, our existence proof allows us to characterize a pairwise equilibrium of these networks.
Introduction
The role of networks in determining the outcome of many important social and economic relationships is now well documented. In many situations, spillovers or externalities created by links are crucial in the sense that a link between two individuals i and j has an effect on the return from the other links of i and j as well as on the return from links between other individuals.
Market sharing agreements and the provision of public good are illustrative examples.
Market sharing agreements situations have been studied by Bloch and Belleflamme (2004) .
The authors pointed out that the European Commission has been particularly aware of the potential risk of market sharing, as firms enjoying monopoly power in certain areas seem reluctant to compete on the overall European market. In particular, it was found that for many years all producers of soda ash in Europe accepted and acted on the home market principle that each producer limited its sales to the country or countries in which it has established facilities. Similarly, in the context of the provision of a public good where a collaborative link between two players is an agreement to share knowledge about the production of the public good, the payoffs obtained by a player i depend on the number of links of player i and on the number of links of her neighbors (see Goyal and Joshi, 2006 All these situations in which the aggregate payoff of an individual depends on the distribution of links of all the players and on the identity of neighbors in the network are referred by Goyal and Joshi (2006) as games with local spillovers. They assume that the payoff function of a player i is the sum of three functions which depend respectively on the number of i's links, the number of links of i's neighbors and the number of links of the remaining players.
The authors use the notion of pairwise equilibrium network as the equilibrium concept, to de- termine what network will emerge. This concept requires players using their Nash equilibrium strategy with the additional restriction that no pair of players has an incentive to add a link. It is worth noting that Goyal and Joshi (2006) deal with existence and characterization of pairwise equilibrium networks under different combinations of spillovers that arise from the formation of links in games with local spillovers. However it is not easy to obtain results when the payoff of player i satisfies convexity in own links and the strategic substitutes property with regard to links of neighbors. Convexity (Conv) means that marginal return of player i from a link is increasing in the number of collaborative links she has formed. The strategic substitutes property (SSP) means that the marginal return of a player i from a link with a player j is decreasing in the number of links formed by j.
It is striking that Goyal and Joshi do not find existence for games satisfying these properties. It follows that we do not know whether a game with these properties is consistent with a steady state solution.
Our paper provides existence results for a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies both convexity and the strategic substitutes property. It fills an interesting gap in the literature since there exist several situations which can be modelled as a game with local spillovers, with a gross payoff function that simultaneously satisfies Conv and SSP. For instance, the market sharing agreements game between homogeneous firms with linear cost and linear demand in each market, which competeà la Cournot in national markets satisfies these properties. 3 Indeed, it is easy to check that in this game the fewer competitors a firm has (the more numerous its links are), the greater is its incentive to have fewer competitors on its market (to form an additional link). So the game satisfies Conv. Likewise, the fewer competitors on a foreign market are, the lower is the incentive to form a market sharing agreement (a link) with the national firm. It follows that the game also satisfies SSP.
In this paper, we have two contributions which fill the gap in the literature. we provide a condition on the payoff function which allows for the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks.
2. Our second contribution concerns the characterization of the architecture of a pairwise stable network and the architecture of a pairwise equilibrium network. Indeed, our existence proof is based on a process which allows us to give the architecture of a pairwise stable network and the architecture of a pairwise equilibrium network when our sufficient condition is satisfied.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model setup. In section 3 we study pairwise stable networks when the payoff function satisfies Conv and SSP. In section 4 we examine pairwise equilibrium networks when the payoff function satisfies Conv and SSP.
Model setup
Our model setup uses the same notation as in Goyal and Joshi (2006) .
Link formation game. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote a finite set of ex-ante identical players. We assume that n ≥ 3. Every player makes an announcement of intended links. We define s i,j ∈ {0, 1} as follows: s i,j = 1 means that player i intends to form a link with player j, while s i,j = 0 means that player i does not intend to form such a link. Thus a strategy of player i is given by s i = {(s i,j ) j∈N \{i} }. Let S i denote the strategy set of player i. We will frequently refer to all players other than some given subset of players X as "player X's opponents" and denote them by "−X". Thus S −X = j∈N \X S j denotes the space of strategies of player X's opponents, and s −X is an element of S −X . A link between two players i and j is formed if and only if s i,j = s j,i = 1. We denote this link by g i,j = 1 and the absence of this link by g i,j = 0.
A strategy profile s = {s 1 , . . . , s n } therefore induces a network g(s). For expositional simplicity we often omit the dependence of the network on the underlying strategy profile. A network g = {(g i,j ) i∈N,j∈N \{i} } is a formal description of the pairwise links that exist between the players.
We let G denote the set of all networks, i.e. the set of all undirected networks with n vertices.
Given a network g ∈ G, g + g i,j denotes the network obtained by replacing g i,j = 0 in network g with g i,j = 1. Let N i (g) = {j ∈ N \ {i}|g i,j = 1} be the set of players with whom player i has formed a link in the network g, and let η i (g) = |N i (g)| be the cardinality of this set. The empty network g e is the network where no player has formed links. A complete component,
The complete network g N is the network where there is a link between all players in N. In this paper, we construct complete networks with subsets of N. We denote by g X the complete network associated with the set of players X ⊆ N.
Payoff function. Define Ψ 1 : {0, . . . , n − 1} → Ê, Ψ 2 : {1, . . . , n − 1} → Ê and Ψ 3 : {0, . . . , n − 2} → Ê as functions. Let π i : G → Ê be the gross payoff function of player i. Using the gross payoff function defined by Goyal and Joshi (2006, pg.331), we have for all g ∈ G:
(
In this class of games the payoff of each player i ∈ N is the sum of three additive effects (i) the payoff that player i obtains due to the number of direct links she has formed, (ii) the payoff that player i obtains due to the number of links formed by players with whom i has formed a link, and (iii) the payoff that player i obtains from the number of links formed by players with whom i has not formed any link. It is worth noting that the spillovers result from the two last effects. Moreover, let
, and
. The marginal gross profits to player i from a link with player j in g are given by:
Therefore, in this class of games, the marginal return to player i from a link with player j depends only on the number of links of i and j, and is independent of the number of links of k = i, j.
The (net) payoff function of player i is given by:
where c is the unit cost of forming a link.
We now provide an example where the payoff function satisfies Equation 2. 
The first term Ψ 1 (η i (g)) is the profit earned by firm i on market i when i forms η i (g) links, that is there are n − η i (g) competitors on this market. The second term Ψ 3 (η j (g)) is the profit earned by firm i on market j when i does not form a link with firm j and j has formed η j (g) links, that is there are n − η j (g) competitors on market j. Note that if a firm i forms a link with a firm j, then she does not compete on market j, so she obtains no profit from this market. Therefore
The marginal gross payoff to firm i from forming a link with firm j is given by:
Next, we assume that the payoff function satisfies the following two properties.
1. Convexity (Conv): ∆Ψ 1 (x) is strictly increasing.
Strategic Substitutes Property (SSP):
∆ϕ(x) < 0.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) also use the notion of strong monotonicity given below. For all x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}:
We now show that there exist conditions such that Example 1 satisfies Conv and SSP.
Example 1 revisited. It can be checked that if Ψ 1 is convex 5 and Ψ 3 is increasing in the number of links of other firms 6 , then the aggregate gross payoff function satisfies Conv and SSP.
Next we borrow an example from Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2010) of a local spillover game that satisfies both Conv and SSP.
Example 2 (Learning from others, Billand, Bravard and Sarangi, 2010) This example specifically focuses on the strategic management notion of "benchmarking" (Camp, 1989) . Consider n firms. For simplicity assume that each firm i faces unit price and aims to produce a given quantityQ i at the lowest total production cost. We assume that firms i and j can share information about their business processes if they set a partnership (in our context a link). Moreover, the more partnerships firm j has, the less firm j can spend time with firm i and so the less this partnership is valuable for firm i.
The production cost of each firm i is given by:
with α i > 0 for all i ∈ N, and β 0 , β 1 < 0, γ > 0. In order to ensure that the cost is positive, we will assume that α i + (n − 1)β 0 + (n − 1)β 1 > 0. We can now write the payoff function as:
Then the marginal gross profit to firm i from forming a link with firm j is:
The returns from a link with a firm j depends on the time firm j can spend with firm i. More precisely, the larger the number of links firm j has formed, the smaller is the payoff of forming a link with this firm (β 1 < 0). Finally, for firm i the returns from a link with a firm j depends on the number of links formed by i. In a context where more players form links, the more they become efficient in making good use of additional links, we have γ 0 < 0.
To sum up, we have
It can be easily verified that the aggregate gross payoff function satisfies Conv and SSP. Note that unlike Example 1, this example uses only the first two terms of equation 2.
We now state two definitions of network pairwise stability that will be used in the paper.
Definition 1 Pairwise stable network (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) . A network g is pairwise
Definition 2 Pairwise equilibrium network (Goyal and Joshi, 2006) . A strategy profile s * = {s * 1 , s * 2 , . . . , s * n } is said to be a Nash equilibrium if
It is clear that a pairwise equilibrium network is a pairwise stable network.
Pairwise stable networks
In the following example we illustrate the process we use in Proposition 1 to show existence of pairwise stable networks under Conv and SSP.
Example 3 Suppose N = {1, . . . , 8} and the payoff function is given by:
For simplicity let c = 0.
First, we construct the complete network and let players i ∈ {1, . . . , 8} in turn delete one by one the links they do not wish to preserve. We call g 0,1 the network obtained at the end of this step.
Clearly, in g 0,1 , players j ∈ {1, . . . , 5} have no links, and players j ′ ∈ {6, 7, 8} form a complete component. Second, note that 8 = 3 × 2 + 2. We label as g 0,2 the network which contains 2 complete components with 3 players and 2 isolated players. Let players 1 and 2 be the isolated players. Third, we construct the complete network, that we call g 1 , with the set of isolated players {1, 2} = N 1 :
Then we repeat the process, that is we let players i ∈ {1, 2} in turn delete the links they do not want. Clearly, no player has any incentive to remove links in g 1 . We now construct a network calledĝ 1 which contains the 2 complete components with 3 players of g 0,2 and the previous complete component with two players. It is easy to check that this network g is pairwise stable.
We begin with a lemma which is useful for proving Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose the payoff function of each player i satisfies (2) and Conv. Suppose a network g on the player set N ′ = {1, . . . , n ′ }, n ′ ≤ n, which contains a complete component C g , with x+ 1 players, x + 1 ≤ n ′ . If ∆Ψ 1 (x) + ϕ(x) < c, then a player i ∈ C g has an incentive to delete all her links.
Proof Suppose player i belongs to a complete component, C g with x + 1 players in g and ∆Ψ 1 (x) + ϕ(x) < c. We must show that player i has an incentive to delete all her links, that is ∆Ψ 1 (k) − ϕ(x) < c for all k ∈ {1, . . . , x}. By convexity, we have:
for all x > 2. The result follows. Proof In order to prove the proposition, we build an iterative process. To simplify the presentation of this process we set N = N 0 . We start with the complete network g 0 = g N 0 and we build a process in three steps.
Step 1. We order players in a prespecified manner: i = 1, 2, . . . , |N 0 |. In this step if a player, say i, has an option to revise her strategy, then we let her delete one by one the links she does not wish to preserve. Consequently, either no player has an incentive to delete links in g 0 , or there is a player i ∈ N who has an incentive to delete a link in g 0 . In the former case, the complete network g 0 is a pairwise stable network, and the process stops. In the latter case, we give player 1 the option to revise her strategy. We know that players have the same payoff function and they are in a symmetric position in g 0 . It follows that player 1 has an incentive to delete links in g 0 . By Lemma 1 player 1 has an incentive to delete all her links in g 0 . Then we let successively players i ∈ {2, 3 . . . , |N 0 | − 1} revise their strategy. Again, if player i has an incentive to delete a link, then she has an incentive to delete all her links by Lemma 1. At the end of this step,
we obtain a network that we call g 0,1 , where x ∈ {0, . . . , |N 0 |} players have formed no links and Step 2. In this step, we divide |N 0 | by (|N 0 | − x 0 ). Let q 0 be the quotient and r 0 be the remainder. We now construct the network g Step 3. We now construct the network g 1 = g N 1 , that is the complete network constructed from the set of vertices in N 1 .
• Then we repeat Steps 1, 2, and 3 with networks
. . . till we obtain a network g T such that r T = 0.
First we show that network g T exists. To introduce a contradiction suppose that g T does not
exist. Then for all t ∈ AE, we have r t = 0. Moreover we have r t < r t−1 − x t < r t−1 . The last inequality follows from x t = 0 (otherwise r t is null) and the first inequality comes from the fact that the remainder is always strictly smaller than the divisor. Since r t < r t−1 and r 0 is a finite number, it is not possible to obtain the property r t = 0 for all t ∈ AE. Hence g T exists.
We now construct the networkĝ T as follows: (1) if two players i and j are such that i ∈ N ′ t and j ∈ N ′ t ′ , with t, t ′ ∈ {0, . . . , T } and t = t ′ , then there is no link between i and j inĝ T , (2) if players i and j belong to N ′ t , t ∈ {0, . . . , T }, then there is a link between i and j inĝ T if and only if there is a link between i and j in g t,2 . Note that by construction, if player i ∈ N ′ t , t ≤ T , then i belongs to a complete component with r t−1 − x t players inĝ T .
Finally, we show thatĝ T is a pairwise stable network.
We first check that no player has any incentive to delete a link inĝ T . More precisely, we show that each player i ∈ N ′ t , t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, has no incentive to delete a link inĝ T . We know that at period t player x t + 1 did not remove her first link with a player j ∈ {x t + 2, . . . , r t−1 } when she was given the opportunity to do so. This implies that ∆Ψ 1 (r t−1 − x t − 1) + ϕ(r t−1 − x t − 1) > c.
By construction ofĝ
T player x t + 1 belongs to the same complete component inĝ T as she did at the time she had the opportunity to delete a link. Therefore, the marginal payoff of player x t+1 associated with the deletion of a link inĝ
follows that player x t+1 has no incentive to delete a link inĝ T . Since players i ∈ N ′ t \ {x t + 1} and player x t + 1 are in a symmetric position inĝ T , it follows that these other players also have no incentive to delete a link inĝ T . Thus no player i ∈ N has an incentive to delete a link inĝ T .
We now show that pairs of players who are not linked inĝ T have no incentive to form a link.
The proof is in two parts.
First we show that this is true for players, i ∈ N ′ t and j ∈ N ′ t , who are not linked inĝ T . By construction ofĝ T , we know that this network contains a complete component with the players {x t + 1, . . . , r t−1 }. Moreover, we know that during the process player x t removed a (first) link with a player who belongs to this component. This implies that we have c > ∆Ψ 1 (r t−1 − x t ) + ϕ(r t−1 − x t ). It follows that inĝ T , no player i ∈ N, who belongs to a complete component with r t−1 − x t players, has an incentive to form an additional link with a player j who belongs to another complete component with the same number of players.
Second, by convexity we have
, it follows that for each t ∈ {1, . . . , T }, no player who belongs to a complete component with k players, k < r t−1 − x t , has an incentive to form an additional link with a player who belongs to a complete component with r t−1 − x t players.
To conclude, since no player inĝ T has any incentive to accept a link from a player who has formed more links or as many links as she herself has formed, no additional links will be formed between a pair of players in this network if we let players revise her strategy. Since the two conditions of pairwise stability are satisfied byĝ T , this network is pairwise stable.
Clearly, if the profit function given in Example 1 is such that Ψ 1 is convex and Ψ 3 is increasing, then there always exists a pairwise stable network in the market sharing game. Similarly, there always exists a pairwise stable network in Example 2.
Pairwise equilibrium networks
We now study the existence of pairwise equilibrium networks. Recall that the main difference between pairwise stable networks and pairwise equilibrium networks is that the latter gives players the possibility of deleting more than one link at a time. Example 4 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and assume the following parameters for the payoff function.
Ψ 2 (1) = −9.9 Ψ 2 (2) = −10.7 Ψ 2 (3) = −11.1
Moreover suppose Ψ 1 (0) = Ψ 3 (x) = 0 for x ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Clearly, the payoff function satisfies Conv, SSP and strong monotonicity. It is easy to check that given these parameters no network can be a pairwise equilibrium network.
This non-existence result motivates the introduction of a stronger condition on gross payoffs which ensures that there always exists a pairwise equilibrium network. This condition can be stated as
for all x ∈ {2, . . . , n−2}. Recall that the marginal payoff that each player i obtains from forming an additional link with a player j, when both players have formed x−1 links, is ∆Ψ 1 (x)+ϕ(x)−c.
Moreover, −(x − 1)∆ϕ(x) captures the difference in the payoff due to the spillover effect of an isolated player (i) when she forms x − 1 links with players who have formed x − 1 links, and (ii)
when she forms x − 1 links with players who have formed x links.
Note that Condition 1 can also be rewritten as follows:
Hence, the higher SSP (∆ϕ(x)) is, the higher the convexity (∆Ψ 1 (x) − ∆Ψ 1 (x − 1)) must be in order to have ∆Ψ 1 (x) − ∆Ψ 1 (x − 1) > c −ϕ(x) −(x−1)∆ϕ(x) −∆Ψ 1 (x−1). To sum up for Condition 1 to be satisfied, either convexity has to be low enough or convexity has to be high enough relative to SSP.
We now use the market sharing game to provide some economic intuition for Condition 1.
Recall that in the market sharing game, Ψ 2 (x) = 0, for all x ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. To simplify the interpretation we assume that c = 0. It follows that Condition 1 can be rewritten as:
Clearly, ∆Ψ 1 (x) − Ψ 3 (x − 1) is the marginal payoff that firm i obtains from forming a market sharing agreement with a competitor j which has the same number of competitors on its market as i. Consequently, Condition 1 means that for x ≥ 2, 1. either this marginal payoff is negative, that is the payoff that firm i obtains on a market with n − (x − 1) competitors is higher than the additional payoff it obtains on its own market when the number of competitors goes from n − (x − 1) to n − x;
2. or this marginal payoff is higher than (x − 1)(Ψ 3 (x − 1) − Ψ 3 (x − 2)), that is the marginal payoff of firm i is greater than the difference between (i) the payoff i obtains if it enters in
x − 1 markets with n − (x − 1) competitors and (ii) the payoff i obtains if it enters in x − 1 markets with n − x competitors.
Proposition 2 Suppose the payoff function of each player satisfies equation (2), Conv and SSP.
Moreover, suppose Condition 1 is satisfied. Then a pairwise equilibrium network always exists.
Proof In this proof, we use the same process and the same notation as in the proof of Proposition 1. More precisely, we use Step 1, Step 2 and Step 3 given in Proposition 1 and we repeat these steps with networks
. . . till we obtain a network g T such that r T = 0. By the same arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that network g T exists in the process. Then we construct the networkĝ T as in the proof of Proposition 1.
We now show thatĝ T is a pairwise equilibrium network.
First by the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to show that no player has any incentive to delete links inĝ T . We now show that no pair of players, i ∈ N ′ t and j ∈ N ′ t , who are not linked inĝ T have an incentive to form a link. By construction of the process a player who has formed no link inĝ T has no incentive to form a link with another player inĝ T .
Moreover, by construction ofĝ T we know that this network contains a complete component with the players {x t + 1, . . . , r t−1 }. Moreover, we know that during the process player x t removed her links with players i ∈ {x t + 1, . . . , r t−1 }, while player x t + 1 maintained her links with players i ∈ {x t + 2, . . . , r t−1 }. It follows that we have both:
and
Clearly, the two inequalities above are simultaneously satisfied only if ∆Ψ 1 (r t−1 − x t ) < c − ϕ(r t−1 −x t )−(r t−1 −x t −1)∆ϕ(r t−1 −x t ). By Condition 1 we have ∆Ψ 1 (r t−1 −x t ) < c−ϕ(r t−1 −x t ), for all r t−1 − x t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 2}. Consequently, suppose that player x t belongs to a component with r t−1 − x t players inĝ T . In that case, since ∆Ψ 1 (r t−1 − x t ) < c − ϕ(r t−1 − x t ), player x t has no incentive to form a link with a player i ∈ {x t + 1, . . . , r t−1 } inĝ T . It follows that inĝ T no pair of players who belong to two distinct components with the same number of players, have an incentive to form a link. Using convexity, it is straightforward that for each t ≤ T no player who belongs to a complete component with k players, k < r t−1 − x t , has an incentive to form an additional link with a player who belongs to a complete component with r t−1 − x t players.
It follows that inĝ T no additional links will be formed if we let players revise their strategy.
Since the two conditions for pairwise equilibrium are satisfied byĝ T , this network is a pairwise equilibrium network.
We now use the above result in a market sharing game example. In this example, (i) each firm obtains a higher profit on its own market than on the market of another firm when the number of competitors is the same, and (ii) the profit obtained by a firm i on each market k is increasing and convex with the number of agreements made by firm k. It follows that the gross profit function in this example satisfies Conv and SSP. and for x ∈ {3, . . . , 6}, Ψ 1 (x + 1) = 2Ψ 1 (x) − Ψ 1 (x − 1) + ε, and for x ∈ {3, 4, 5}, Ψ 3 (x + 1) = 2Ψ 3 (x) − Ψ 3 (x − 1) + ε. Clearly, we have for all x > 2, ∆Ψ 1 (x) − Ψ 3 (x − 1) < 0 and for x = 2, ∆Ψ 1 (x) − Ψ 3 (x − 1) > Ψ 3 (x − 1) − Ψ 3 (x − 2). Consequently, there exists a pairwise equilibrium network. Moreover, by using the process given in the proof of Proposition 2, we can check that the network with two complete components with three players and an isolated player is a pairwise equilibrium network.
Example 2 revisited. If c, γ 0 , β 0 and β 1 in this example are such that c > −β 0 − γ 0 (1 − 2x) − β 1 /x 2 or c < −β 0 − γ 0 (1 − 2x) + β 1 /x(x − 1), for x ∈ {2, ..., n − 1}, then there always exists a pairwise equilibrium network.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that there always exists a pairwise stable network in a game with local spillovers where the payoff function satisfies convexity and the strategic substitutes property.
Through an example we show that pairwise equilibrium networks however do not always exist.
Finally, we establish that under a stronger condition on the payoff function provided in the paper, a pairwise equilibrium network always exists. Thus, in this paper, we show that there are at least two ways in which a local spillovers game that satisfies both Conv and SSP is consistent with a steady state solution. Additionally, our existence proof also allows us to characterize the set of stable network allowing us to obtain both existence and characterization simultaneously.
